DDASaccident520 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
12-28-2004
DDASaccident520
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident520" (2004). Global CWD Repository. 719.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/719
DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 27/01/2008 Accident number: 520 
Accident time: Not made available Accident Date: 28/12/2004 
Where it occurred: Not made available Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Victim inattention Date of main report: Not made available 
ID original source: none Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Mortar (120mm) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 27/01/2008 
No of victims: 3 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not made available Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
 
Accident report 
Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A 
spreadsheet including the Victim’s name and very brief details of the accident was made 
available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, 
the limited injury implies that the victim’s PPE was being worn in the correct manner. 
This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in 
future. 
The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
“Date and country. [Name removed] - Trauma Care Medic - Deminer – fatality. 
1 
[Name removed] - Acting Supervisor - Deminer - broken leg, superficial injuries. 
[Name removed] – Deminer - Deminer - leg injuries and loss of 4 fingers. 
EOD accident - 120mm mortar shell fitted with type 69 fuse was knocked and 
exploded”. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 684 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: medic  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: Listed as "Fatality". No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 685 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Leg 
COMMENT: Listed as "broken leg, superficial injuries". No medical report was made 
available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 686 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
2 
severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Fingers  
COMMENT: No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because there 
were three Victims which implies that safety distances were not being enforced. The fatality 
was of a medic, which raises questions over whether the person who initiated the device was 
appropriately trained. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the 
management of the demining group declined to make the accident details available. Although 
this is sometimes done to protect the Victims, in this case the Victims’ names were among the 
limited detail made available. It is possible that the managers have chosen to avoid 
transparency because they are afraid that the circumstances of the accident would reflect 
badly on their organisation. 
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